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INTERPRETING ORIENTAL CASES:
THE LAW OF ALTERITY IN THE COLONIAL
COURTROOM
I. INTRODUCTION: READING AND JUDGING
Sir Erskine Perry, Chief Justice of Her Majesty's Supreme Court
in Bombay from 1847 to 1852, opens a collection of cases of "Indian
or Colonial interest"' decided by him with the following observation:
The insight into human life afforded by transactions in a Court of
Justice had always appeared to me to give peculiar opportunities to
an observer for studying national character; but it is especially to a
class like the English in India that such opportunities are most valu-
able. For the chief administrators in our vast Indian empire are so
completely severed from the bulk of the population by colour, race,
language, religion, and material interests, that they are often, if not
habitually, in complete ignorance of the most patent facts occurring
around them. But in courts of justice the veil which shrouds the
privacy of Oriental life is necessarily drawn aside, the strong ties
which at other times bind together cast and family in pursuit ot [sic]
a common object are loosende [sic] under the pressure of stronger
individual interests, and there, amidst masses of conflicting testimony,
. . . the motives, reasonings, and actions of the native population of
India are displayed in broad light and may be traced with inestimable
advantage. 2
Published in London in 1853 under the title Cases Illustrative of
Oriental Life, and known to legal historians simply as Oriental Cases,
this collection of mid-nineteenth-century judicial opinions is of interest
for two reasons. First, colonial legal discourse appears to have es-
caped almost entirely the massive critical reexamination of colonial
discourse that followed the publication of Edward Said's Orientalism
in 1978. However, even a cursory inspection of the paragraph quoted
above suggests that Oriental Cases fits squarely within Said's definition
of Orientalism as "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient
- dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views
of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it . . . .3
This Note attempts, therefore, to draw the attention of critics to
colonial legal discourse as an important constituent of the corpus of
Orientalist writings on India.
I ERSKINE PERRY, CASES ILLUSTRATIVE OF ORIENTAL LIFE DECIDED IN H.M. SUPREME
COURT AT BOMBAY: THE APPLICATION OF ENGLISH LAW TO INDIA at v (photo. reprint i988)
(1853).
2 Id. at iii-iv (footnote omitted).
3 EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 3 (1978).
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Second, having situated Oriental Cases within the framework of
Orientalism, one must ask how it operates as an Orientalist text. The
text's self-consciously "illustrative" aspirations attract attention in-
stantly. To a student of the law, the violent visual metaphor of using
the power of the law to draw aside "the veil which shrouds the privacy
of Oriental life" - in other words, of disrobing the Orient through
the law - is intriguing. Generally speaking, the law does not "illus-
trate" the parties that stand before it, but structures and resolves the
disputes they bring to it. Even the fields of comparative law and law
and anthropology, both of which attempt "illustrations" of one kind
or another, study the law as it is located within societies and as an
artifact of societies. Unlike these fields, however, Oriental Cases at-
tempts to "illustrate" the Orient through the law. The judge peers
through his own laws, the laws of the colonizer, to "illustrate" a foreign
society, the colonized. The law is therefore not an object of study
but a methodology or means of "illustration." It is a type of filter or
lens permitting a peculiar kind of reading - the reductive transfor-
mation of a social text constructed in a courtroom into an "illustrative"
Orientalist ethnography.
What makes the colonial courtroom an exemplary site for reading?
The passage quoted above suggests two answers. First, at least in
the i84os, the courtroom is one of the few points on the extensive
border between colonizer and colonized where some form of commu-
nicative exchange exists. The relative scarcity of other points of con-
tact makes it vital that readings thus procured be transmitted to the
"chief administrators in our vast Indian empire" who are "so com-
pletely severed from the bulk of the population." Therefore, the law
in the 184os performs a function that is later performed by modern
visual-interpretive disciplines such as anthropology. 4 Second, crises
originating within the colonized population gravitate toward the co-
lonial courtroom, where they explode and offer themselves up for
reading. But for the colonial judge, these particularly revealing mo-
ments of crisis - the unraveling of the "strong ties which at other
times bind together cast and family" - would remain unread.
4 Although disciplines such as anthropology and history detached themselves from the court-
room as the nineteenth century wore on, they continued to assist courts in the business of
judging. This is abundantly illustrated by the passage in 1872 of the Indian Evidence Act (Act
I of 1872). The penultimate paragraph of § 57 of the Act lists matters of which judicial notice
shall be taken. Thus, "on all matters of public history, literature, science or art, the Court may
resort for its aid to appropriate books or documents of reference." Indian Evidence Act of 1872
(Act I of 1872), § 57, reprinted in JOHN WOODROFFE, WOODROFFE AND AMEER ALI'S LAW OF
EVIDENCE APPLICABLE TO BRITISH INDIA 467-69 (8th ed. 1925). This leading Indian textbook
on the law of evidence lists the ethnographic and historical texts relied upon by Anglo-Indian
courts to assist them in the business of judging. The list comprises almost every text on India
that acquired canonical status under colonial rule. See id. at 474-76. The relationship between
systematized bodies of colonial knowledge and colonial law undoubtedly contains a riveting
story, but one that is beyond the scope of this Note.
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However, Oriental Cases does not stand for the naive proposition
that law is a transparent lens that enables unproblematic, unmediated
readings of crisis-stricken "natives." On the contrary, the text is
acutely conscious of the law's limitations as a lens, of its occasional
opacity, of its ability to sanction misreadings. Misreadings are partic-
ularly worrisome, not only because they may be reproduced as "false"
Orientalist knowledge, but also because they may mislead the judge
(who belongs, after all, to the class of "chief administrators in our
vast Indian empire") in the business of judging - forcing the social
text constructed in the courtroom into legal categories. Therefore,
when the law contains obstacles - for example, rules permitting
"masses of conflicting testimony" 
- such obstacles may distort the
judge's reading and threaten the precision of his judgment.
Obstacles to reading are harmless when reading is itself unneces-
sary. However, this can only happen when the judge operates within
his own society. Back in England, judges may dispense with reading
because they share with the parties before them "a common religion,
a common mother tongue, and a unity of race - the national opinions
and prejudices, with the knowledge of an infinite number of facts
which are too familiar to all present to form subject of remark .... -5
These happy commonalities enable the English judge in England to
surmount legal obstacles to reading such as "[t]he weight due to
testimony" 6 that, in India, can be disturbingly obfuscatory. What
remains as the business of the courtroom in England is pure judging.
And judging is itself pure, automatic, unerring, infallible. Complete
commonality between the judge and the parties "point[s] conclusively
to the decision, which the audience as well as the Bench are irresis-
tibly led to adopt."' 7
In India, by contrast, colonial law operates on the heavily guarded
border between the hermetic categories of colonizer and colonized.
Therefore, reading - as a self-conscious and aggressive operation -
must always exist to penetrate the category of the colonized. But
reading is always profoundly destabilized by its origins in the divide
between colonizer and colonized, which first imprisons the colonized
behind a veil of unreadability (in other words, within the category of
the colonized) and then sanctions reading operations designed to "draw
aside" this veil. Therefore, the failure of any individual act of reading
(and of the individual act of judging associated with it) may be
attributed not only to the dangers of reading through the occasionally
turbid lens of the law, but also to a more fundamental inability to
read through the scrupulously maintained divide between colonizer
5 PERRY, supra note i, at iv.
6 Id.
7 Id. (emphasis added).
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and colonized. Predictably enough, this inability is transposed onto
the colonized themselves, so that they become irreducibly, even ge-
netically, unreadable. Accordingly, Oriental Cases complains that "as
the knowledge of native manners increases [so] do the difficulties which
impede an English official in the administration of justice become
embarrassing."8 Therefore, the fundamentally unreadable are also
fundamentally unjudgeable. While the English judge in England
judges infallibly by virtue of complete cultural commonality with the
parties before him, "guides to the judgment are either wholly wanting
or are transfigured to the Anglo-Saxon who is dispensing justice to
Hindus, Musalmdns, and Parsis." 9 Hence, the judge of Oriental Cases
must approach both reading and judging with equal degrees of cau-
tion.
It is against this backdrop that the "illustrations" of Oriental Cases
must be received. Before they may be examined in greater depth,
however, it is essential to situate Oriental Cases within its historical
context.
II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND AN ABBREVIATED
HISTORY OF ANGLO-INDIAN LAW
It is of critical importance to recast the history of Anglo-Indian
law10 as a narrative of violence to territory, text, and person that
must always supplement - if not supplant - the mission civilisatrice
narrative of British rule. The foundation of the legal system that
produced Oriental Cases dates to the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and
the East India Company's subsequent acquisition of control over the
Mughal provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. The first judicial
plan devised in 1772 by Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General
of Bengal, assured Hindu and Muslim inhabitants of the newly won
provinces that their "personal laws" - a colonial term, encompassing
the laws of inheritance, marriage, religious usage, and so on - would
be governed by the "Shaster" and the Koran, respectively.11 This first
ritual incantation promising to protect the personal laws of Indians
would be repeated throughout the nineteenth century. Native Law
Officers - pundits in the case of Hindus and maulvies in the case of
Muslims - were attached to Anglo-Indian courts to declare the sacred
laws of both religious communities to English judges in order to
minimize violence to these laws.
8 Id. (emphasis added).
9 Id.
10 For more comprehensive accounts of Anglo-Indian law, see generally J. DUNCAN DER-
RETT, RELIGION, LAV AND THE STATE IN INDIA passim (i968), and M.P. JAIN, OUTLINES OF
INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY passim (I99o).
11 See JAIN, supra note io, at 61. The term "Shaster" refers to the entire corpus of Hindu
religious-legal texts and commentaries.
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Almost immediately, however, it was felt that the Native Law
Officers were untrustworthy. "I can no longer bear to be at the mercy
of our pundits," Sir William Jones confesses in a private letter, "who
deal out Hindu law as they please, and make it at reasonable rates,
when they cannot find it ready made. '' 12 So began the momentous
process of controlling sacred legal texts through translation, from
which the textual Orientalist tradition of British India descends.
Translations were inevitably accompanied by the marginalization of
Native Law Officers, the invasion and colonization of legal "space"
by dislodging and disempowering local tribunals, the imposition of
English procedural requirements upon cases, the surreptitious incor-
poration of English legal standards into Hindu and Muslim law, and
an as yet undocumented process of judicial legislation that has escaped
the scrutiny of contemporary historians almost entirely.
More important for purposes of this Note is Anglo-Indian law's
treatment of the vast body of unwritten customary law that had long
governed the lives of many communities, but that often differed sub-
stantially from the textual law administered by English judges. Un-
doubtedly motivated by established attitudes of distrust toward Indian
litigants, but also by the traditional hostility of English courts to
customs claimed to derogate from settled law, Anglo-Indian courts
required Indian litigants to "prove" the validity of hitherto unwritten
customs according to the highly stringent evidentiary test articulated
in the eighteenth-century Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone
with respect to local customs in England. According to the test, a
local custom had to meet the following seven requisites in order to be
recognized as legally valid: the custom must have been so long used
"that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary";13 it must have
been continuously followed; it must have been peaceable, and ac-
quiesced in; it must be reasonable; it must be certain; although estab-
lished by consent, it must be compulsory; and lastly, customs must
be consistent with each other. 14
Indian litigants' attempts to "prove" the existence of customs under
Blackstone's test resulted in the construction in the courtroom of a
massive social text especially suited to judicial reading operations.
Nevertheless, despite the importance of custom as a field for the
launching of such operations, the history of custom in the nineteenth
12 Letter from Sir William Jones to Charles Chapman (Sept. 28, 1785) in 2 THE LETTERS
OF SIR WILLIAM JONES 683-84 (Garland Cannon ed., 1970).
13 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *76. In Blackstone's test, the "memory of
man" referred to legal memory, which ran as far back as the reign of Richard the First. See
id. at *76 n.to. Anglo-Indian courts modified this definition, so that legal memory ran back to
the establishment of the Supreme Court of Calcutta in 1773. See Ashutosh Mukerjee, Customs
and Customary Law, 9 BOMBAY L. REP. J. 225, 243 (1907).
14 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *76-*78.
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century is one of depredation at the hands of textual law, as an ever
greater number of individuals were subjected to texts identified, trans-
lated, elevated, interpreted, and applied by Anglo-Indian judges. This
story remains untold and is in danger of slipping into oblivion - the
only exhaustive treatment of the role of custom in Anglo-Indian law
is Sripati Roy's largely uncritical Custom and Customary Law in Brit-
ish India, published in i9ii. xs Nonetheless, the story is an instance
of a violent wielding of Orientalist texts against the colonized.
This account of the history of Anglo-Indian law shows that the
violent visual metaphor that opens Oriental Cases is girded by "real"
violence, which sanctions the invocation of a broader philosophical
critique of violence, law, and justice. In Critique of Violence (Zur
Kritik der Gewalt), Walter Benjamin states that "[t]he task of a cri-
tique of violence can be summarized as that of expounding its relation
to law and justice." 16 Jacques Derrida describes Benjamin's distinc-
tion between two kinds of violence in law: "the founding violence,
the one that institutes and positions law (die rechtsetzende Gewalt,
'law making violence') and the violence that conserves, the one that
maintains, confirms, insures the permanence and enforceability of law
(die rechtserhaltende Gewalt, 'law preserving violence')." 17 For Ben-
jamin, violence that is neither law-founding nor law-preserving "for-
feits all validity. '"18 Derrida, on the other hand, unearths brilliantly
the inherent invalidity of law-founding violence - invalid precisely
because it must always, by definition, precede law:
In these situations said to found law (droit) or state, the gram-
matical category of the future anterior all too well resembles a modi-
fication of the present to describe the violence in progress. It consists,
precisely, in feigning the presence or simple modalization of presence
These moments, supposing we can isolate them, are terrifying
moments. Because of the sufferings, the crimes, the tortures that
rarely fail to accompany them, no doubt, but just as much because
they are in themselves, and in their very violence, uninterpretable or
indecipherable. 19
IS SRIPATI Roy, CUSTOMS AND CUSTOMARY LAW IN BRITISH INDIA passim (I911). This
Note does not suggest that Anglo-Indian legal commentators were unaware of the increasing
textualization of Anglo-Hindu and Anglo-Muslim law. At least one late nineteenth-century legal
commentator mounted a scathing attack upon Anglo-Indian law precisely for its excessive
reliance upon text. See J.H. NELSON, A VIEW OF THE HINDU LAW AS ADMINISTERED BY THE
HIGH COURT OF MADRAS passim (1877). Nonetheless, there exist no comprehensive legal (or
social) histories of the fate of customary law in the nineteenth century.
16 WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS, Au-
TOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 277, 277 (Peter Demetz ed. & Edmund Jephcott trans., x986).
17 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," II CARDozo L.
REv. 919, 981 (Mary Quantance trans., 199o).
18 BENJAMIN, supra note I6, at 287.
19 Derrida, supra note 17, at 99 I .
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Later, Derrida collapses Benjamin's distinction between law-founding
violence and law-preserving violence:
I shall propose the interpretation according to which the very violence
of the foundation or position of law (Rechtsetzende Gewalt) must
envelop the violence of conservation (Rechtserhaltende Gewalt) and
cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of fundamental
violence that it calls for the repetition of itself and founds what ought
to be conserved, conservable, promised to heritage and tradition, to
be shared. . . . Conservation in its turn refounds, so that it can
conserve what it claims to found. Thus there can be no rigorous
opposition between positioning and conservation .... 20
In other words, Derrida argues that instances of law-preserving vio-
lence carry within themselves instances of law-founding violence, typ-
ically justifying themselves through recourse to the "mythical foun-
dations" of law-founding violence (which, by definition, are always
constructed after the actual founding). 21
Both Benjamin and Derrida are concerned with the problem of
violence and law in "the European model of bourgeois, liberal, par-
liamentary democracy." 22 British India was neither bourgeois, nor
liberal, nor parliamentary, nor democratic. Nonetheless, Derrida's
framework lends itself easily to Anglo-Indian law. It is historically
incontestable that there was an essentially "indecipherable" law-found-
ing violence at the origin of Anglo-Indian law, even if only from the
perspective of the colonized. Before examining whether this law-
founding violence replicates itself in subsequent instances of law-
preserving violence (or, more broadly defined, everyday instances of
adjudication), however, it is essential to identify the foundational
myths of Anglo-Indian law to which all of its judicial performances
returned. The most obvious of these is Anglo-Indian law's repeated
assurance that it was administering to Indians their "own" laws - a
myth of continuity and non-disruption.23
Yet Anglo-Indian law raised the banner of non-disruption to em-
bark upon a massive reading operation encompassing both the con-
20 Id. at 997.
21 In the American context, these mythical foundations often consist of the "original intent"
of the Framers of the Constitution or "the plain meaning of the words" of the Constitution.
See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, The Violence of the Masquerade: Law Dressed Up As Justice, ii
CARDozo L. REv. 1047, iosx-6i (employing Derrida's analysis to deconstruct the U.S. Supreme
Court's reliance upon "original intent" and "plain meaning" to uphold a Georgia anti-sodomy
law in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. i86 (x986)).
22 Derrida, supra note 17, at 979.
23 However, even Anglo-Indian law's most sympathetic and non-disruptive moment - that
of valorizing and defending Hindu law texts - was founded upon a notion of the essential
alterity of the people that produced those texts, and of those texts themselves. See Jenny
Sharpe, The Violence of Light in the Land of Desire; or, How William Jones Discovered India,
20 BOUNDARY 2, at 26, 36-37 (1993).
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tainment of the personal laws of Hindus and Muslims in English
translations, codes, and treatises and the deployment of Blackstone's
evidentiary test against unwritten customary law. The myth of non-
disruption therefore licensed the construction of an enormous colonial
text and legitimated reading operations into it. However, as suggested
earlier, any self-conscious and aggressive attempt at reading is always
founded upon the notion that what is read is fundamentally unread-
able. At the heart of Anglo-Indian law's foundational myth of non-
disruption, therefore, lurks another myth, one that permeates all of
Orientalist discourse perhaps, but undoubtedly imbues Oriental Cases:
a myth of unreadability. The myth of unreadability at the core of
Anglo-Indian law is constitutive of and constituted by the construction
of the colonized as irreducibly different. From it radiate myths of
non-disruption and continuity and - as the consequence of both of
these - the twin functions of reading and judging.
Anglo-Indian law performs its readings and judgings more or less
uneventfully until it approaches the limits of its ability to read through
the colonizer-colonized divide. It is then forced to invoke the myth
of unreadability in a direct and unmediated fashion to produce judicial
results. And unlike violence-concealing myths of readability and pres-
ence, 24 the myth of unreadability always sanctions a dramatic cele-
bration of law-founding violence exactly as suggested by Derrida.
III. THE KOJAHS AND MEMONS' CASE
Undoubtedly the most famous of the judgments in Oriental Cases,
the 1847 opinion in The Kojahs and Memons' Case25 is a classic
instance of the uses of myth and violence. Classified as an "illustra-
tion" of "Mahomedan Succession," the Kojahs and Memons' Case turns
on the conflict between the textual Koranic law of succession and an
alleged customary law of succession derogating from it. The case
arises under a variant of Warren Hastings' Plan of 1772, which re-
quired Anglo-Indian courts to uphold and administer the laws of the
two gigantic categories - Hindu and Mahomedan - into which the
"natives" were divided. This legal framework embodies, therefore,
the myth of non-disruption:
In the case of Mahomedans or Gentoos, 26 their inheritance and succes-
sion ... shall be determined, in the case of the Mahomedans, by the
24 See supra p. 1717.
25 PERRY, The Kojahs and Memons' Case (Bombay S.C. 1847) in CASES ILLUSTRATIVE OF
ORIENTAL LIFE DECIDED IN H.M. SUPREME COURT AT BOMBAY: THE APPLICATION OF EN-
GLISH LAW TO INDIA, supra note x, at iio [hereinafter The Kojahs and Memons' Case]. The
Kojahs and Memons' Case is reported at 4 Indian Dec. (Old Series) 707 (Bombay S.C. z847).
26 In the late nineteenth century, the word "Gentoo" was described as follows:
Gentoo is a corruption of the Portuguese Gentio, a Gentile. Dr. Fryer (Travels, 1672 to
1681) says 'the Gentues, the Portugal idiom for Gentiles, are the aborigines.' He appears
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laws and usages of the Mahomedans, and where the parties are Gen-
toos, by the laws and usages of the Gentoos, or by such laws and
usages as the same would have been determined by if the suit had
been brought and the action commenced in a native Court. 27
The test to prove the existence of the custom in The Kojahs and
Memons' Case consists of the familiar "seven requisites which Black-
stone has laid down for the validity of an English custom. '28
The Kojahs and Memons' Case involves two "particular sects of
Mahomedans" - the Kojahs and the Memon Cutchees - who govern
themselves by a customary rule of succession "nearly analogous to the
Hindu rule of succession." 29 In the Kojahs' case, the plaintiff Hirbae
brought suit to obtain a declaration from the Supreme Court of Bom-
bay that "she, as a Mahomedan female, [was] entitled to the share in
distribution of her father's property which is ordained in the Koran. 30
The defendants, the executrixes of the will of the plaintiff's uncle
(who had taken possession of the estate of the plaintiff's father upon
the latter's death), averred the opposite:
[A]l the parties to the suit belong to a certain exclusive sect or cast
of Mahomedans called Kojahs, which has existed from time imme-
morial, separate and distinct from other bodies or sects of Mahome-
dans, and under the government of divers laws and customs peculiar
to themselves, and differing in many respects from the laws and
customs of the Mahomedans .... 31
Under the customary law of succession governing the Kojahs, females
were not entitled to any share of their father's estate. Therefore, the
question in The Kojahs and Memons' Case is whether the Supreme
Court may, in a case involving Mahomedans, give effect to a custom
at variance with the rule laid down in the Koran.
The Kojahs and Memons' Case - which requires the parties to
"prove" the existence of the custom - is obviously well-suited to
reading and judging. But how susceptible are the Kojahs to a reliable
reading upon which a more or less reliable judgment may be based?
to be the first English writer by whom the term was used; but before his time, Pietro
del la Valle speaks of the Hindus as Gentile, following the example of the Portuguese.
Notwithstanding those unquestionable authorities, Halhed (Gentoo, Code xxi, xxii.) sup-
poses that the Portuguese borrowed the term Gentoo from the Sanskrit word Gunt, a
sentient being.
EDWARD BALFOUR, I THE ENCYCLOPMDIA OF INDIA 1189 (London, Bernard Quaritch 3d ed.
1885).
27 The Kojahs and Memons' Case, supra note 25, at 123.
28 Id. at 120 (typeface altered); see supra p. i715.
29 The Kojahs and Memons' Case, supra note 25, at rio. The similarity between the facts
and questions of law involved in both cases is the reason they are combined and governed by
a single judgment. However, the opinion devotes far more attention to the Kojahs than to the
Memons, and therefore this Note deals only with its treatment of the Kojahs.
30 Id. at III.
31 Id.
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Haunted by the foundational myth of unreadability, the opinion os-
cillates between a drive toward reading and an equally powerful
counter-drive to maintain a fundamental unreadability. It is this bat-
tie between certainty and obscurity that structures the opinion and
culminates in its eruption in a reenactment of law-founding violence.
A. Reading
Is reading in The Kojahs and Memons' Case different, by virtue
of its specifically ethnographic character, from the familiar "statement
of facts" encountered in judicial opinions? One of the distinguishing
characteristics of ethnographic writing is that it is invariably a form
of "writing back," of transforming readings acquired in the field into
discourse addressed to a metropolitan audience. Therefore, if the
implied reader 32 of an ethnographic text may also be one of the
ethnographer's interlocutors, the text is not, strictly speaking, ethno-
graphic. At this most basic level, one may conclude that no "native,"
lawyer or litigant, could be the implied reader of The Kojahs and
Memons' Case, because the "native" who could read The Kojahs and
Memons' Case - let alone comprehend its references to European
jurists (Thibaut, Austin, von Savigny) and its occasional erudite (and
untranslated) quotations from Latin sources - did not exist in the
I84Os.
3 3
The fact that The Kojahs and Memons' Case meets this negative
test is, of course, insufficient to mark it as an instance of ethnographic
writing. However, the opinion contains specifically ethnographic pas-
sages embedded in a matrix of legal discourse. Johannes Fabian
describes what he labels the "Ethnographic Present" - a temporal
device unique to ethnographic discourse that permits ethnographers
to make such statements as "The X are matrilineal" - as one of the
devices employed by anthropology to distance itself temporally from
its Other. Fabian writes:
The use of the present tense in anthropological discourse . . . marks
a literary genre (ethnography)[,] reveal[ing] a specific cognitive stance
towards its object, the monde comment6. It presupposes the givenness
32 Gerald Prince's seminal article on the implied reader posits that every text contains "a
zero-degree narratee" who knows "the tongue (tongue) and the language(s) (langage[s]) of the
narrator." Gerald Prince, Introduction to the Study of the Narratee, in READER-RESPONSE
CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM 7, io (Jane P. Tompkins ed., i98o).
To know a tongue "is to know the meanings (denotations) of all the signs that constitute it,"
although it does not necessarily "include knowledge of the connotations (the subjective values
that have been attached to them)." Id.
33 Cf. GAURI VISWANATHAN, MASKS OF CONQUEST: LITERARY STUDY AND BRITISH RULE
IN INDIA 44 (1989) (tracing the beginnings of education in English in India to the passage of
the English Education Act of 1835). Indians who had a grasp of the language sufficient to
embark upon a career in the law did not appear for at least another twenty years.
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of the object of anthropology as something to be observed. The present
tense is a signal identifying a discourse as an observer's language.34
When scoured for instances of the "Ethnographic Present," The Kojahs
and Memons' Case yields passages that are almost detachable from
the rest by virtue of their ethnographic nature. These passages rep-
resent the transformation into colonial knowledge of readings obtained
through the examination of "a great many witnesses, comprising the
chief and most intelligent members of the Kojah cast . . . , who told
us all that they appeared to know themselves respecting their origin,
history, habits, and religious opinions." 35 The "us" in this passage
unquestionably refers to the judge-ethnographer, who interrogates his
interlocutors for "all they appear to know." It is hardly surprising,
then, that the text - after outlining its methodology - opens its
announcement of the results of the reading operation with the "Eth-
nographic Present" in its most classic manifestation: "[t]he Kojahs are
a small cast in Western India . "-36 From this point, the text
proceeds to describe the Kojahs in the meticulous fashion of an eth-
nography. No detail - language, appearance, occupation, places of
residence, history - is omitted. 37 The fact that The Kojahs and
Memons' Case continued to be cited verbatim as a source of infor-
mation on the Kojahs more than sixty years after it had been written
underscores the assiduity of its reading operation. 38
Who are the Kojahs? The judge of The Kojahs and Memons' Case
amasses details about the Kojahs, straining to fashion a dependable
reading based upon "hard facts" that, he hopes, might assist him in
arriving at an unerring result. Among other things, the following
"reliable" facts emerge: the Kojahs "appear to have originally come
from Sindh or Cutch" and "are now settled [in] Cutch, Kattiawar,
and Bombay"; in Bombay, they number about two thousand; their
occupations are "confined to the more subordinate departments of
trade"; "by their own traditions, [they] were converted from Hinduism
[to Islam] about four hundred years [earlier] by a Pfr named Sadr
Din"; and "their chief reverence at the present time is reserved for
Agha Khan, . . . whom they believe to be a descendant of the Pir,
who converted them to Islam. '39 Most importantly, this profusion of
facts achieves the ostensible goal of the reading operation at the
impressive level of certainty assured by Blackstone's evidentiary test:40
34 JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECT
86 (1983) (citations omitted).
35 The Kojahs and Memons' Case, supra note 25, at ii2 (emphasis added).
36 Id. (emphasis added).
37 See id. at 112-14.
38 See, e.g., Roy, supra note 15, at 411-14.
39 The Kojahs and Memons' Case, supra note 25, at 112-13.
40 See id. at 120.
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the Kojahs have proved with "little or no conflicting testimony" that
their custom of succession does in fact exist. 41
However, having proved the existence of the custom, the judge
must now approach the question of judging. Should he strike down
the custom because it is in conflict with Koranic law, which governs
the parties to the case, who are - by their own admission - Ma-
homedans? Or should he uphold the custom and prevent Koranic law
from overriding it? The answer to these questions would seem to lie
in the Koranic law itself, which supposedly governs all other aspects
of the lives of the parties, provided the parties can be shown to be
Mahomedans. Since the "self-image" of the Kojahs is by itself insuf-
ficient to establish their identity as Mahomedans, the law must embark
upon a second reading operation.
However, upon launching this second reading operation, the judge
immediately confronts the limitations of his ability to read. Initially
led to believe that the Kojahs are Mahomedan, the ethnographer-
judge discovers a wealth of bewildering details pointing in the opposite
direction. Although the Kojahs abandoned Hinduism four hundred
years ago, Hinduism resembles "the black soil in the Deccan, which
... convert[s] all foreign substances brought into contact with it into
its own material";42 the Kojahs are Hindu in manners, dress, and
appearance; 43 "even to the blood of their saint [the Kojahs] adhere by
a frail tenure";44 "they call themselves Shfas to a Shia, and Sunnfys
to a Sunnfy, and they probably neither know nor care any thing as
to the distinctive doctrines of either of these great divisions of the
Mussalmdn world";45 "[t]hey have . . .no translation of the Koran
into their vernacular language, or into Guzarati their language of
business, [despite] the long succession of pious Mussalmdn kings who
reigned in Guzarat";46 they can claim no scholar possessing a knowl-
edge of Arabic or Persian, the two great languages of Islamic learn-
ing;47 finally, their only current religious text "appears to be a strong
combination of Hindu articles of faith with the tenets of Islam." 48
The lamenting judge-ethnographer becomes openly accusatory:
[T]he cast never seems to have emerged from the obscurity which
attends their present history, and the almost total ignorance of letters,
of the principles of their religion, and of their own status, which they
41 Id. at II2.
42 Id. at 112-13.
43 See id. at 112.
44 Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
45 Id. at 114.
46 Id.
47 See id.
48 Id.
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now evince, is probably the same as has always existed among them
since they first embraced the precepts of Mahomed. 49
The Kojahs come to embody the obscurity upon which the judge's
sophisticated reading operation runs aground. Their inherent unread-
ability condemns the judging operation to radical uncertainty, and the
judge is powerless before it.
It is evident, of course, that the text has stumbled upon the
fundamentally cognitive - but also classically Orientalist and legal
- problem of fitting reality into discrete categories. The unreadability
of the Kojahs is not an essential, ontological unreadability, but stems
from the inadequacy of the categories themselves. The Anglo-Indian
legal system, founded upon the myth that the laws of "Hindus" and
"Muslims" would be "protected," founders when it confronts groups
such as the Kojahs that exist between these categories. The text
recognizes this fact when it admits that a group it initially classified
as "Mahomedan" does not believe in "some supposed obligatory force
in a text called Divine [the Koran]."50 Conceding the fragility of its
readings before the unreadability of the colonized, the text makes the
following reluctant confession:
It was believed erroneously that the population of India might be
classified under the two great heads of Mahomedan and Gentoo ....
It may be questioned whether one individual in the Legislature, -
with the exception, perhaps, of Mr. Burke, - was aware of the
sectarian differences which distinguished Shfa from Sunniy; and not
even that great man, we may be assured, was at all conscious that
there were millions of inhabitants in India, such as Sikhs, Jains,
Parsfs, Israelites and others, who had nothing, or next to nothing, in
common with Brahminical worship. 5 '
However, it is absolutely critical to remember that Anglo-Indian
law is not attempting to fit "reality" into its categories. Its reading
operation is directed not at "reality" but at the social text of the
colonized - a text that Anglo-Indian law has itself forced into creation
by imposing Blackstone's evidentiary test upon Indian custom. Fur-
thermore, the unreadability of the Kojahs is nothing more than the
fundamental unreadability of the colonized upon which Anglo-Indian
law's reading operations are founded. It is absolutely vital that this
myth of unreadability be preserved from extinction, even while Anglo-
Indian law continually launches reading operations against it.
Anglo-Indian law reveals its will to preserve the unreadability of
the colonized when it is asked to jettison its reading operations. The
parties in The Kojahs and Memons' Case, upon learning of their
49 Id. at 113.
SO Id. at 126.
Si Id. at 123-24.
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unreadability in the eyes of Anglo-Indian law, offer the Court an
escape from its dilemma. Instead of wrestling with the ultimately
unanswerable question of how to categorize the Kojahs, the Court
could simply apply to their case the law of England as the lex loci
("the general law of the place").5 2 If the Kojahs could not be fitted
into the categories of "Hindu" and "Muslim," they could simply be
governed by English law, which would liberate the Court from its
obsession with launching reading operations against the colonized's
seemingly fundamental unreadability.
The opinion firmly rejects this suggestion, realizing that the ap-
plication of English law as the lex loci could potentially put an end
to unreadability itself, thereby creating a dangerous breach in the wall
between colonizer and colonized. Accordingly, the text declares that
English law as the lex loci cannot be applied because "[t]he doctrine
of lex loci seems to be one of altogether modern growth, and peculiar
to Christendom.'5 3 This powerful reconsecration of the difference
between colonizer and colonized has both essentialist and evolutionary
dimensions. First, lex loci, which implies that all individuals within
a territory shall be governed by the same law, can only exist unprob-
lematically among "the nations of Europe[,] [which] have such a family
character from this similarity of race, institutions, and religion, that
the municipal laws of any one Christian country are, without any
violence, applicable to every Christian stranger who comes within its
jurisdiction . . . .,54 The doctrinal foundations of lex loci vanish
when "a Christian and non-Christian nation come in contact. 55 Sec-
ond, lex loci is depicted as possessing an evolutionary dimension. The
opinion states that lex loci arose as a result of racial miscegenation
within the Roman Empire.5 6 Early Roman law, however, did not
recognize the doctrine, but followed instead the system of administer-
ing to Roman citizens their own laws, while appointing a praetor
peregrinus for strangers.5 7 Just as in the early Roman empire, "in the
East, from the oldest times, an immiscible character has been kept
up; foreigners are not admitted into the general body and mass of the
society of the natives; they continue strangers and sojourners, as all
their fathers were."58 The East does not permit the application of
one law because it is composed of essentially immiscible peoples. The
evolutionary scale along which the East and West, non-Christian and
Christian, colonized and colonizer are arranged is evident.
S2 See id. at 126.
S3 Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
55 Id.
56 See id. at 126.
57 See id.
5s Id. at 127.
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More noteworthy is the fact that the opinion presents itself as the
protector of the immutable immiscibility of the East - in other words,
as an agent of non-disruption. It refuses the parties the benefits of
English law in order to preserve the East's immiscibility from violence,
in order to keep itself out, as it were. It is conspicuous, however,
that the havoc that would result from applying English law to the
lives of parties hitherto governed by "native" law is never once men-
tioned as the rationale for non-disruption. Instead, the Court's re-
sponse to the call to mingle colonizer and colonized under a single
law is its enigmatic, but ultimately highly revealing, recourse to im-
miscibility - not only the immiscibility among Eastern peoples, but
also the concealed, and therefore more profound, immiscibility of East
and West, which is, of course, nothing but an unmediated invocation
of unreadability. The rhetoric of non-disruption conceals, therefore,
an insistence that the colonized be maintained, even imprisoned, be-
hind a veil of unreadability, because it is ultimately upon this impris-
onment that the imperial rule of law depends.
B. Judging
Albeit trapped between the unreadability of the colonized and its
own determined refusal to erode that unreadability, Anglo-Indian law
cannot evade the imperative of pronouncing judgment. Its ultimate
escape to judgment lies in a reenactment of the "indecipherable" vio-
lence of its foundation - the restaging of the Battle of Plassey in the
colonial courtroom. However, rather than appearing abruptly and
without warning, this violence is a veritable leitmotiv in the opinion.
Violence lurks in four different places in The Kojahs and Memons'
Case. First, it marks the transition from ethnographic discourse to
"pure" legal discourse. After acknowledging the existence in fact of
the alleged custom, the opinion suddenly reaffirms its naked power to
recognize or reject the custom: "These facts having been established,
the first question which arises is, whether this peculiar custom of
succession which has prevailed from time . . . immemorial amongst
these casts, can be sanctioned in a British Court of justice?"59
Second, after embarking upon a discussion of the history of custom
in general and of the tolerance of legislatures toward customs dating
back to Roman times, the opinion contrasts two contemporary theories
of the relationship between custom and law. Thibaut's System des
Pandekten Rechts, instantly discredited as the work of a "great mod-
s9 Id. at 115 (emphasis added). Of course, there has already been an affirmation of power
in forcing the custom through Blackstone's evidentiary test, but this affirmation receives only a
passing mention in the opinion. See id. at 120.
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ern civilian," 60 is cited for the notion that a custom acquires the force
of law simply by virtue of the intentional adherence and common
consent of a class of persons, so long as the custom is not unreasonable
and applies to matters left undetermined by the written law.61 "Pro-
fessor Austin, on the other hand," maintains that "[e]very positive law,
or rule of positive law, exists as such by the pleasure of the Sover-
eign."62 A custom without the imprimatur of the sovereign is, there-
fore, no law at all. The opinion has no difficulty in choosing the more
authoritarian of the two theories. Fiercely protective of its territory,
it dismisses Thibaut's theory of custom as a source of law. "English
law" and "the sound principle of universal law" dictate that a "custom
. . . require the sanction of the Court, as representing the sovereign
authority, before it obtain[s] any legal validity."63 Only Anglo-Indian
law may finally determine what is and is not valid.
Third, in response to the plaintiffs' argument that "this Hindu
custom of disinheriting daughters, which has been adopted by [the
Kojahs], is most unreasonable, and that public policy would dictate
the adoption of the wiser rule laid down in the Koran," 64 the opinion
points out carefully that "[w]here public policy accords with the well-
recognized track of morality, it is the duty of the Judge to make every
decision conform to it[,] but wherever public policy is a matter of
controversy, a lawyer should be the last to express any opinion upon
it .... "65 However, while admitting that the reasonableness of the
Kojah custom is "a matter of controversy," the opinion reserves the
right to establish the boundaries within which this "controversy" may
unfold. The plaintiffs' argument is doomed to failure because "[the]
custom for females to take no share in the inheritance is not unrea-
sonable in the eyes of English law; for it accords in great part with
the universal custom as to real estates . . . and entirely with some
local customs mentioned in Blackstone .... ,,66 The plaintiffs have
thus reached the limits of Anglo-Indian law. For all Anglo-Indian
law's non-disruptiveness, these limits are unmistakable, inviolable,
and English. In uncertain cases, Indian women may not enjoy more
extensive rights to property than their English counterparts.
Finally, and this time to pronounce judgment, the opinion resorts
to the violence of Anglo-Indian law's very presence in India. As a
60 Id. at 117. A "civilian" is "one who practices or has made a special study of the Roman
or modem civil law [especially] as distinguished from the canon law and the English common
law." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 413 (1986).
61 See The Kojahs and Memons' Case, supra note 25, at 1I7.
62 Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at i19.
64 Id. at 120.
6S Id.
66 Id. (typeface altered) (emphasis added).
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last resort, the plaintiffs demand that the deviant custom of the Kojahs
be struck down because it is in conflict with "the Divine law as
revealed to [the plaintiffs, and presumably all Kojahs, as Mahome-
dans] by the Koran; [and because] in this respect it is equivalent to a
custom in England which conflicts with a subsequent act of Parlia-
ment. '67 There can be no other response to this subversive attempt
to place the Koran and the British Parliament on an equal footing
but a climactic and wholly unmediated return to the violence of the
foundation of Anglo-Indian law. Accordingly, the opinion resorts to
the terrifying narrative of conquest and subjugation:
When India fell to the arms of the British it was competent to the
Legislature to have repealed the whole of the law which the greater
part of the inhabitants considered Divine. It might have been very
intolerant and tyrannical to have done so ....
. . .But . . . the rule laid down in the act of Parliament would
have to be enforced. 68
Thus, the opinion establishes unequivocally that the Divine law
of the Mahomedans exists only at the sufferance of the secular power
of the colonizer. The secular judge "recognises the existence of divine
laws, and their validity in foro conscientice with those to whom they
are addressed, or who believe in the revelation containing them"69 but
to him they are mere concomitants of the dictates of his sovereign
that he apply them.
Therefore, the divine law of the Koran, as incorporated by a
putatively "non-disruptive" Anglo-Indian law, is denuded of its divin-
ity and robbed of its mystical authority. This subjugation of the divine
law of Muslims reaffirms, reenacts, and even exceeds the merely
temporal cataclysm of the Battle of Plassey in r757. In its refusal to
recognize the divinity of the Koran, Anglo-Indian law exposes its
promise of non-disruption as a strategic and reversible decision
adopted only to facilitate the business of ruling (which, by all ac-
counts, it was).
The opinion adds a further indignity to its humiliation of divine
Koranic law. Since both Koranic law and the deviant Kojah custom
exist at the sufferance of the sovereign, the opinion argues, there'is
no reason why they should not be placed on exactly the same footing.
The plaintiffs' attempt to equate Koranic law with the British Parlia-
ment is transformed into Anglo-Indian law's equation of Koranic law
with every custom that deviates from it.
67 Id. at 121.
68 Id. at 122-23.
69 Id.
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Therefore, it is by transcribing the violence of its founding into
the violence of shaking the divinity out of hitherto divine law that
Anglo-Indian law concludes The Kojahs and Memons' Case. This
outcome is exactly as Derrida describes. 70 However, unlike the foun-
dational myths of metropolitan law, which obscure law's founding
violence, the myth of unreadability - which, as a possible justification
of Anglo-Indian law's founding violence, is indistinguishable from it,
and therefore ultimately unjustifiable - results in an overt reenact-
ment of law's founding violence. It is hardly surprising, then, that it
is the reasoning of The Kojahs and Memons' Case, and not its result,
which won it its fame. 71
IV. CONCLUSION
How, then, does The Kojahs and Memons' Case draw aside the
"veil which shrouds the privacy of Oriental life"?72 Combining within
itself both the ethnographic (reading) and judicial (judging) functions
of colonial rule, but always founded upon the myth that the colonized
are ultimately unreadable, the drive to preserve that myth, and the
unavoidable truth that unreadability must always afflict judging, the
case "illustrative" of Oriental life becomes a reading/judging operation
that repeatedly affirms the presence of colonial rule. Indistinguishable
in moments of collapse, and hopelessly entangled at all other times,
reading and judging return incessantly to the colonial ethnographer-
judge, ultimately fusing with his authority, just as the violence that
preserves law is ultimately indistinguishable from the violence that
founds it. That is why The Kojahs and Memons' Case, its wealth of
"illustrative" ethnographic detail notwithstanding, is not an account
of "native" crisis, 73 but one more elaborately woven tale of colonial
rule.
70 See supra p. 1717.
71 Although The Kojahs and Memons' Case upholds the validity of custom over textual law,
thus setting itself at odds with Anglo-Indian law's general hostility to custom, it was long hailed
as one of Anglo-Indian law's "elaborate and classic" legal pronouncements. RoY, supra note 15,
at 4o6.
72 PERRY, supra note I, at iii.
73 J.C. Masselos, The Kojahs of Bombay: The Defining of Formal Membership Criteria
During the Nineteenth Century, in CASTE AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN
INDIA 97, iO6-07 (Imtiaz Ahmad ed., 2d ed. 1978), reveals that The Kojahs and Memons' Case
was the expression of a deep political conflict within the Kojah community about its identity,
and that Anglo-Indian law was only one of several battlefields on which this conflict was
manifested.
For a description of Anglo-Indian law's subsequent dealings with Kojah and Memon custom
throughout the nineteenth century, see Roy, cited above in note x5, at 4o5-18.
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